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LABOR LAW-LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT-LINKING "EMPLOYER

SPEECH" TO No-SotICITATION RuLE-During an organizational campaign the employer prohibited any dissemination of literature on company
property and soliciting or campaigning on company time by employees
while itself distributing within the plant non-threatening, anti-union
literature. General Counsel for the NLRB contended that by this conduct
the employer "interfered with, restrained or coerced" employees in their
exercise of the right to self-organization.1 This contention was rejected
by the NLRB,2 but on appeal was accepted by the Court of Appeals for·
the District of Columbia.3 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
FREE

1

Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 141, 140, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §§158(a)(l);-

157.
Nutone, Inc. and United Steelworkers of America, CIO, 112 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1955).
United Steelworkers of America, CIO v. NLRB, Nutone, Inc., Intervenor, (D.C.
Cir. 1956) 243 F. (2d) 593.
2
3
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held, reversed, two justices dissenting. Even if an employer could commit an
unfair labor practice by enforcing an otherwise valid no-solicitation rule
while itself engaging in solicitation activities that would violate the rule
if engaged. in. by employees, there is no basis in the record for such a
finding here. NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, CIO, 357 U.S.
357 (1958).
The Supreme Court had not previously faced the question whether
employer distribution coupled with enforcement of a no-solicitation rule,
each activity being valid if examined individually, could constitute unlawful activity. In two recent cases, however, circuit courts had ruled
on a similar combination of enforcement of a valid no-solicitation rule,
d~livery of a non-threatening, anti-union speech, and denial of union
requests for equal opportunity to address employees. The Second Circuit
in Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB 4 held that such conduct was an unfair
labor practice; the Sixth Circuit in NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co.5 held
that it, was not. The basic cause of this divergence was disagreement on
the applicability of section S(c), 6 the "employer free speech" provision
of t4!'!: .amended National Labor Relations Act. Although courts had
recogIJ.ized non-coercive partisan expression by employers as lawful before
enactment of this section,7 they had been quick to find statements of opinion
coercive, originally by considering coercion as inherent in an employer's
economic powe~ and -later by relating such statements to a coercive
course of conduct.9 Moreover, speech was found unlawful because delivered
on company property during working hours to a "captive audience."10
Section S(c) was designed, in part, to prevent the Board from holding
speech unlawful under the "captive audience" theory11 and from connecting
it with unrelated unfair labor practices.12 However, the section left un-

(2d Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 640, cert. den. ll45 U.S. 905 (1953).
(6th Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 78.
6 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 142, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(c). This
section -provides that expression or dissemination of any views "shall not constitute or
-be evidence of an unfair labor practice ... if [it] contains no threat of reprisal or force
or promise of benefit."
7 NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941), re-hearing, 319 U.S.
533 (1943): NLRB v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, (8th Cir. 1944) 145 F. (2d) 556; NLRB v.
American Tube Bending Co., (2d Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 993, cert. den. 320 U.S. 768 (1943).
8 E.g., NLRB v. Federbush Co., (2d Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 954.
· 9 E.g., NLRB v. Virginia ·Electric & Power Co., note 7 supra.
10 E.g., Clark Bros. Co., 70 NL.R.B. 802 (1946). Affirmed on narrower grounds in
NLRB v. Clark Bros. Co., (2d Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 373.
11 For particular reaction to the Clark Bros. decision, note 10 supra, see H. Rep. 245,
80th Cong.,_ ls~. sess., p. 33 (1947). See, generally, S. Rep. 105, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp.
23-24 (1947); H. Conf. Rep. 510, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 45 (1947); 93 CoNG. REc. 64436447, 6859-6860 (1947).
12See Monumental Life Insurance, 69 NL.R.B. 247 (1946). See also the pre-enactment
material, note 11 supra.
.
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certain13 whether the unlawfulness of expression was to be determined
solely by language used or also by examination of the circumstances.14
Thus, as might be expected, varying interpretations of section S(c) were
employed in the principal and analogous cases. Under the Bonwit Teller15
view enforcement of a no-solicitation rule is unfair or "discriminatory"
if the employer uses the plant forum and denies union requests for the
same opportunity. The court there found that section S(c) was inapplicable since the question raised was the employer's right to use unfair
campaign methods, not its right to deliver an anti-union speech. It
also stated that the denial of "equal opportunity" for union speech
at the plant necessarily established serious interference with organizational
activity since exclusive use of the plant forum implied a tremendous
practical advantage that could not be counteracted by alternative means
of communication. On the other hand, the W oolworth 16 view denies that
the employer must allow the union "equal opportunity." The court there
believed that so to link speech and action would place on the employer's
right to speak a limitation not found in section S(c) and that only limitations expressed in that section could be recognized. Further, it felt that
the employer's refusal to share its plant forum could not be "interference"
unless the union showed the inadequacy of alternative communication
facilities. The Supreme Court has taken a middle-ground position. First,
it has accepted the Bonwit Teller theory that employer expression closely
related to action within a course of conduct is not protected by section S(c).
Such an interpretation appears more reasonable than an absolute-right
view of the section, especially since employees will be influenced by the
joint impact of such employer conduct. Second, the Court follows the
Woolworth view that employer speech plus enforcement of a no-solicitation
rule, when combined, are not necessarily unlawful. Activity is "unfair"
under the act only when it interferes with the exercise of organizational
rights. The Court takes the logical position that interference cannot
invariably be presumed but should be based on a Board evaluation of

13 For discussion of the general success of §8(c) in clarifying the extent of protection
accorded employer speech, see note, 43 GEo. L. J. 405 (1955); Kovar, "Reappraisal of
Employer Free Speech," 3 DEPAUL L. •REv. 184 (1954); note, 38 VA. L. REv. 1037 (1952).
14 The enacted version of §8(c) omitted both the House qualification on "contains"
of "by its terms" and the Senate specification of "under all the circumstances." For use
of the House version see NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., note 5 supra; for approval of
the Senate approach see NLRB v. Kropp Forge Co., (7th Cir. 1950) 178 F. (2d) 822.
15 Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, note 4 supra. Accord, NLRB v. American Tube
Bending Co., (2d Cir. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 45. See also dissenting opinions in NLRB v.
F. W. Woolworth Co., note 5 supra, and Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
For discussion of the importance of the plant forum, see Livingston dissent and note, 61
YALE L. J. 1066 (1952).
16 NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., note 5 supra. Accord, Livingston Shirt Corp., note
15 supra (no-solicitation rule confined to working hours). See also dissenting opinion in
Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, note 4 supra.
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industrial actualities. Although presumptions of a refusal of equal opportunity and of the inadequacy of alternative communication channels may
be justified, especially where the more extensive impact of a no-solicitation
(as contrasted with a no-distribution) rule is involved, again it appears
more practical for the Board rather than the judiciary to apply these
presumptions. Thus, the Court in the principal case has clarified the
function of section 8(c). It has indicated that the section does not provide
absolute protection for employer speech but instead allows expression
linked with closely related action to constitute an unfair labor practice
if, under the circumstances, an actual interference with opportunities for
organizational communication can be clearly demonstrated.
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